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THE RIGHT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Yoram Dinstein
It is impossible to assert, at the present point, that a general right to humani-tarian assistance has actually crystallized in positive international law. Such a
general right, had it consolidated, could be invoked in all circumstances: in
peacetime (either in the face of endemic problems of famine, malnutrition, and
disease, or—perhaps especially—when natural disasters occur) as well as in the
course of armed conflicts (either international or internal). In reality, however,
there is no clear-cut right under existing international law to humanitarian as-
sistance in peacetime, not even when natural disasters strike.1 To the extent that
the right to humanitarian assistance is vouchsafed by binding norms of interna-
tional law (customary or conventional), this is so only in certain contexts of
armed conflict.2
During an armed conflict (whether international or
internal), the issue of humanitarian assistance arises
solely as regards the indispensable needs of the civilian
population. That is to say, first, that when offered or re-
quested, humanitarian relief must be confined to civil-
ians—it cannot be extended to combatants. Second,
relief consignments can include only essentials, such
as food, water, medications, clothing, bedding, and
means of shelter. Clothing, bedding, and means of shel-
ter are of particular relevance to refugees and displaced
persons, but all civilians in a devastated area (including
those with roofs over their heads) may be in dire need
of food, water, and medications.
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There are principally three scenarios in which the issue of humanitarian as-
sistance may come into focus in armed conflict (whether international or
internal).
• A belligerent party controlling the territory inhabited by civilians possesses
the essential provisions required and, given good will, could distribute
them without undue difficulty to meet the demand. Yet, it pursues a
deliberate policy of denying supplies to those in need (primarily, enemy
civilians or persecuted minorities).
• Essential provisions are available to a belligerent party that is desirous of
distributing them to the civilians in need, but distribution is obstructed by
the enemy.
• Essential provisions within the territory controlled by a belligerent party
are generally scarce, or the distribution system has collapsed owing to the
ravages of the armed conflict.
In the first two instances, the situation can be remedied by the belligerents
themselves (acting alone or in tandem). In the third, humanitarian relief can
come only from outside sources—neutral states or charitable nongovernmental
organizations—which must gain access to the afflicted area.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
It is useful, at least from the perspective of juridical theory, to distinguish in
armed conflict between a right of the civilian beneficiaries to demand or obtain
humanitarian assistance and a right of states (or impartial humanitarian orga-
nizations, like the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]) to insist
on providing such assistance.3 Should it be recognized that civilians have a right
to demand or obtain humanitarian assistance, it is necessary to pinpoint the
party bearing the corresponding duty to render that assistance. In the first two
instances mentioned above, a duty can be imposed by international law on one
or another of the belligerent parties. In the third instance, the situation is more
complex. Surely, civilians do not have an absolute right to demand relief from
the outside, applicable erga omnes (that is, vis--vis the entire international
community). In other words, it would be absurd to contend that every state in
the world is duty bound to come up, on demand, with relief aid to civilians em-
broiled in any armed conflict, wherever it is raging.4 However, if relief is offered
by a neutral state (or an impartial humanitarian organization), civilians may
have a right to insist that shipments reach their destination, and belligerents may
have a corresponding duty to enable free passage. Moreover, the neutral state
may have a right vis--vis the belligerents—and, as circumstances dictate,
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vis--vis other neutral states through whose territories the shipments must be
routed—to expect that relief consignments will actually be allowed to get
through to the civilian beneficiaries.
SETTINGS FOR HUMANITARIAN AID
No customary norm has so far crystallized in the international law of armed
conflict to establish a general right to humanitarian assistance (of whatever
type) solely because provisions are scarce. It is, therefore, proposed to address
here different factual settings arising in armed conflict. Each presents its own
problems and its own solutions. These discrete settings are: occupied territories,
siege warfare, maritime blockade, aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict,
general relief supplies from the outside, and noninternational armed conflicts.
Additional issues to be discussed are germane to enforcement measures and the
responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations.
Occupied Territory
When enemy territory is subject to belligerent occupation, the legal position as
regards humanitarian assistance to the local civilian population is the clearest.
Article 55(1) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War prescribes that “[T]o the fullest extent of the
means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food
and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the nec-
essary foodstuffs, medical stores, and other articles if the resources of the occu-
pied territory are inadequate.”5
The authoritative ICRC commentary on this convention sets forth that
according to article 55(1), the occupying power incurs “a definite obliga-
tion to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions under which
the population of the occupied territory lives.”6 Article 69(1) of the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), broadens the list of objects specified in article 55(1) by itemizing also
clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and any other supplies essential to the
survival of the civilian population.7
In employing the phrase “[T]o the fullest extent of the means available to it”
in Article 55(1) of Geneva Convention (IV), as well as in article 69(1) of Proto-
col I, the framers of the two instruments show their awareness of the predica-
ments in which the occupying power is likely to find itself in time of armed
conflict (indeed, it may itself be exposed to a maritime blockade imposed by the
enemy). Assuming a paucity of supplies at hand, the question is whether the oc-
cupying power must allow humanitarian relief (when offered) from the outside.
D I N S T E I N 7 9
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Article 59(1)–(2) of Geneva Convention (IV) sets forth that “[I]f the whole or
part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Oc-
cupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and
shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be
undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the
provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.”8
As stressed in the ICRC commentary on article 59, the obligation imposed on
the occupying power to enable such relief consignments to reach the civilian
population “is unconditional.”9
A violation of article 59 of Geneva Convention (IV) is not enumerated in ar-
ticle 147 as one of the “grave breaches” of the convention.10 On the other hand,
“wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conven-
tions” is categorized as a war crime in article 8(b)(xxv) of the 1998 Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (which is not yet in force).11
Siege Warfare
The legality of siege warfare was not contested in classical international law; the
legitimacy of attempting to reduce a besieged place through starvation was “not
questioned.”12 Article 17 of the Geneva Convention (IV) deals with siege warfare
in a very peripheral way, proclaiming, “The Parties to the conflict shall
endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encir-
cled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity
cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and
medical equipment on their way to such areas.”13 Obviously, only limited cate-
gories of civilians benefit from this stipulation. Besides, “[T]he words ‘The
Parties to the conflict shall endeavour’ show that under the Convention evac-
uation is not compulsory”; article 17 amounts merely to a strong recommen-
dation to belligerents to conclude an agreement effecting the removal of
those enumerated.14
The legal position is radically altered in article 54 of Additional Protocol I,
which reads:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for
the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the
motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or
for any other motive.
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3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by
it as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, how-
ever, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may
be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or wa-
ter as to cause its starvation or force its movement.15
The starvation of civilians is not enumerated in Protocol I itself as a “grave
breach” (and therefore a war crime).16 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that article
8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes
the following in the list of war crimes: “Intentionally using starvation of civil-
ians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the
Geneva Conventions.”17 The last words are of particular importance, inasmuch
as they specifically stigmatize as a war crime a deliberate denial of humanitarian
assistance in breach of the Geneva Conventions.
A siege laid to a defended town (inhabited by civilians) must be distinguished
from one encircling a military fortress.18 In the latter case, since the sustenance
only of members of the enemy armed forces is at stake, starvation is a legitimate
method of warfare, and it is permissible to destroy systematically all foodstuffs
that can be of use to the besieged. By contrast, in the former case, inasmuch as ci-
vilians are directly affected, starvation and the destruction of foodstuffs are in-
terdicted. In conformity with Protocol I, “A food supply needed by the civilian
population does not lose its protection simply because it is also used by the
armed forces and may technically qualify as a military objective. It has to be used
exclusively by them to lose its immunity.”19 Yet, even pursuant to article 54 of the
protocol, the besieging force can probably prevent supplies from getting
through if civilians are guaranteed safe passage out of the besieged area.20
Maritime Blockade
Article 23(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) enunciates, “Each High Contracting
Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital
stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of
another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall like-
wise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, cloth-
ing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and
maternity cases.”21
Although no explicit reference to blockade is made in article 23(1), there is no
doubt that blockade constitutes the background of this clause.22 The obligation
D I N S T E I N 8 1
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created in it is extremely limited in scope. Apart from being subjected to various
conditions spelt out in other paragraphs of article 23, free passage of consign-
ments for all civilians is confined to medications, and other items (food and
clothing) are circumscribed to certain segments of the population deemed sin-
gularly vulnerable.23 There is plainly no requirement to allow the supply of food
and clothing to the civilian population in general.24
Other provisions pertaining to blockades appear in article 59(3)–(4) of the
Convention.Paragraph (3) states that “[A]ll Contracting Parties shall permit the
free passage of these consignments
and shall guarantee their protec-
tion.”25 According to paragraph (4),
“[A] Power granting free passage to
consignments on their way to terri-
tory occupied by an adverse Party to
the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate
their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably sat-
isfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for
the relief of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the
Occupying Power.”26 These stipulations must, of course, be read together with
paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 59 quoted above, dealing with relief consign-
ments to occupied territories. Paragraph (3) is viewed by the ICRC commentary
as “the keystone of the whole system”; its thrust is that such consignments must
be allowed to cross through a blockade, subject to verification and supervision.27
The prohibition—incorporated, as noted, in Protocol I—of starvation of ci-
vilians as a method of warfare does not by itself render blockade unlawful as a
method of warfare, provided that such starvation is not the sole purpose of the
blockade.28 This follows from the language of article 49(3) of the Protocol: “The
provisions of this Section [articles 48–67] apply to any land, air or sea warfare
which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects
on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against ob-
jectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law appli-
cable in armed conflict at sea or in the air.”29
As the ICRC commentary on the protocol explains the paragraph, “In general
the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference were guided by a concern not to un-
dertake a revision of the rules applicable to armed conflict at sea or in the air.
This is why the words ‘on land’ were retained and a second sentence clearly indi-
cating that the Protocol did not change international law applicable in such situ-
ations was added.”30
Even those advocating the illegality of a blockade giving rise to starvation of
civilians are forced to concede that their position collides head-on with the
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original intention of the diplomatic conference that the instrument it produced
have no impact on the law of blockades.31
Aliens
As far as aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict are concerned, article
38(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) confers upon them the right “to receive the in-
dividual or collective relief that may be sent to them.”32 As the ICRC commen-
tary expounds:
Relief as meant here will consist, for example, of consignments of food, clothing and
medical supplies sent to the protected persons individually or collectively. Such con-
signments may come either from the country of origin of the protected persons or
from any other country and may be sent by private individuals, humanitarian orga-
nizations or governments.
The right of protected persons to receive relief implies an obligation of the country of
residence to allow the consignments to enter its territory and to pass them on intact
to the addressee.33
Relief from the Outside
Article 70 of Protocol I pronounces:
1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the con-
flict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies
mentioned in Article 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in
character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken,
subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers of
such relief shall not be regarded as an interference in the armed conflict or as un-
friendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to
those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing
mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be ac-
corded privileged treatment or special protection.
2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facili-
tate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and per-
sonnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined
for the civilian population of the Adverse Party.
3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow the pas-
sage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with para-
graph 2:
(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search,
under which such passage is permitted;
D I N S T E I N 8 3
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(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this as-
sistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;
(c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for
which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent
necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.
4. The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their
rapid distribution.
5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall en-
courage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions re-
ferred to in paragraph 1.34
In contradistinction to article 23(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) cited earlier,
article 70(1) of Protocol I “expands relief entitlement to the whole population,
and not only to vulnerable segments” thereof.35 Furthermore, article 70(1) em-
ploys the phrase “shall be undertaken,” which—when taken alone—“clearly im-
plies an obligation to accept relief offers meeting the requirements mentioned in
the article.”36 However, one cannot disregard the glaring fact that implementation
of the implied obligation is explicitly subject to an agreement between the parties
concerned. “Consent—the expression of sovereignty—is hence a basic principle in
the exercise of the right to humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts.”37
As long as an agreement by all concerned lies at the root of relief actions, one
cannot speak of a genuine obligation to allow, or a genuine right to obtain, hu-
manitarian assistance. At best, article 70(1) may be construed as precluding re-
fusal of agreement to relief for arbitrary or capricious reasons.38 Regrettably,
there are a host of nonarbitrary and practical reasons that can be invoked by a
belligerent in armed conflict if it chooses to withhold its consent from the deliv-
ery of relief supplies to civilians. The upshot is that the framers of article 70(1)
created “the impression of an ironclad obligation, and at the same time took the
bite out of that rule.”39
Noninternational Armed Conflicts
For the legal position in noninternational armed conflicts, it is necessary to con-
sult two sources. First, there is common article 3 of the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, which states, “An impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to
the conflict.”40 Undeniably, the pivotal word here is “offer.” Hence, the parties to
the conflict can always choose to decline it.41
The second source is the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).42 Article 14 of Protocol II prohibits both
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starvation of civilians as a method of combat and attacking objects indispens-
able to the survival of the civilian population.43 However, it must be taken into
account that the 1998 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court—
which, as mentioned, brands as a war crime the starvation of civilians in an in-
ternational armed conflict (includ-
ing the de l ib er a te denia l of
humanitarian relief supplies as pro-
vided for by the Geneva Conven-
tions)—does not treat in the same
manner the starvation of civilians in
a noninternational armed conflict.
The omission was by no means accidental.44 It is conspicuous in light of the long
catalogue of war crimes in internal armed conflicts encompassed in article 8 of
the statute.45
Article 18 of Protocol II prescribes:
1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red
Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for
the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the
armed conflict. . . .
2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the sup-
plies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief ac-
tions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and
impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be
undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.46
A leading role in the field of international humanitarian assistance is tradi-
tionally played by the ICRC.47 Yet, interestingly enough, article 18 of Protocol II
does not mention the ICRC by name. Thus, if one looks for a legal niche to ac-
commodate the ICRC, it is necessary to fall back upon common article 3. “Para-
doxically, it can thus be said that in this respect it is common article 3 which
‘develops and supplements’ the Protocol rather than vice versa.”48
Article 18(2) appropriately imposes the condition of nondiscrimination in
the distribution of humanitarian assistance from the outside; supplies cannot be
sent solely to one section of the civilian population and be denied to other
groups. But once more, the core issue is that of consent, which is emphatically
required. The ICRC commentary suggests that if the survival of the civilian
population is threatened, the authorities responsible cannot withhold their
consent without good grounds (implying that such action would constitute a
violation of article 14).49 The trouble is that as long as consent is essential, those
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authorities can usually find plausible excuses for delaying humanitarian assis-
tance, and even for frustrating it altogether.
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Occasionally, the Security Council of the United Nations adopts resolutions
calling upon the parties to an armed conflict to allow unimpeded delivery of hu-
manitarian supplies to civilians. Such calls must be analyzed carefully. More of-
ten than not, they are couched in merely hortatory terms, as recommendations,
in which case they do not per se introduce any change in the legal situation.
Where relief is contingent on the consent of the parties concerned, consent re-
mains the crux of the issue. Still, at times the Security Council resorts to binding
language, citing specifically chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
(devoted to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and secu-
rity).50 Pursuant to article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations
must “accept and carry out” the decisions of the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter.51 It is not entirely clear which decisions of the Council are cov-
ered by article 25, but decisions under chapter VII are indisputably binding.52
Thus, when the Security Council decides to exercise the powers vested in it by
virtue of chapter VII, the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict
undergo a fundamental transformation; their freedom of action is curtailed.
It is only natural that the Security Council tends to move gradually in this
field (as in others), first urging parties (in a nonbinding fashion) to allow unim-
peded delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians, and only subsequently
(when its appeal remains unheeded) moving to assert itself under chapter VII in
a binding fashion and even imposing sanctions. A good illustration can be
found in a series of resolutions of 1992 relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Se-
curity Council first adopted Resolution 752, simply calling upon the parties to
ensure that conditions be established for the effective and unhindered delivery
of humanitarian assistance.53 Then, the Security Council demanded in Resolu-
tion 757—specifically referring to chapter VII—that the parties immediately
create these conditions.54 In Resolution 770, the Security Council—again acting
under chapter VII—expressed its determination to create as soon as possible the
necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever re-
quired in Bosnia-Herzegovina.55 When all else failed, the Security Council de-
cided, in Resolution 781, to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, considering the measure to constitute “an essential element
for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”56 It is possible to say that
in Bosnia-Herzegovina the protection of humanitarian aid became “the de facto
raison d’être of the UN mission.”57
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THE USE OF FORCE TO ENSURE RELIEF
A separate question is whether forcible measures can be used against a state con-
travening the right to humanitarian assistance (in the specific circumstances in
which that right exists). There is a school of thought holding that states may use
force at their discretion to coerce a recalcitrant nation to respect international hu-
manitarian law (so-called “humanitarian intervention”).58 However, “humanitar-
ian intervention is not an exception to the [UN] Charter prohibitions on the use
of force.”59 The Charter prohibits any use of unilateral force in interstate relations,
except in circumstances of self-defense in response to an armed attack.60 The In-
ternational Court of Justice in 1986, in the Nicaragua case, rejected the notion that
forcible humanitarian intervention is permissible on a unilateral basis.61
On the other hand, article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations instructs the
Security Council to determine when a
threat to the peace occurs.62 Upon
concluding that a situation amounts
to a threat to the peace, the Security
Council is empowered to resort to en-
forcement action against the state concerned. “[A] threat to the peace in the sense of
Article 39 seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace.”63
The Security Council definitely can decide that the deliberate blocking of human-
itarian assistance to civilians in dire need of it amounts to a threat to the peace and
that an enforcement action is the proper remedy.
Indeed, in Resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council authorized member
states to use “all necessary means” to establish “a secure environment for hu-
manitarian relief operations in Somalia.”64 The expression “all necessary means”
has become a commonly employed euphemism for the use of force (which in-
deed followed, in the Somalia case, although success proved elusive).
Pursuant to article 53(1) of the Charter, the Security Council can, where ap-
propriate, utilize regional organizations “for enforcement action under its au-
thority.”65 Article 53(1) does not diminish from the monopoly of the Security
Council, as established in the Charter, in the realm of collective security. The le-
gality of the enforcement action by a regional organization is entirely contingent
on Security Council authorization.66 The Security Council can launch or ap-
prove a genuine humanitarian intervention, in order to counter breaches of the
right to assistance—or of any other norm of international law—that it deems
threats to peace. However, no state acting solitarily—nor even a regional organi-
zation—can arrogate the powers of the Security Council.
In March–June 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a con-
tinuous campaign of severe and sustained aerial attacks against Yugoslavia, with
a view to compelling a settlement of the issue of Kosovo. It is true that prior to
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the attacks, in Resolution 1199 (1998), the Security Council, acting under chap-
ter VII of the Charter, had affirmed that “the deterioration of the situation in
Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and secu-
rity in the region.”67 That affirmation was repeated in Resolution 1203 (1998),
also based on chapter VII.68 Resolution 1199 noted a Yugoslav commitment “to
ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC
and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], and delivery of hu-
manitarian supplies.”69 The Security Council, alarmed by what it termed an “im-
pending humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo, was fully competent to take or
authorize enforcement action against Yugoslavia, by identifying a threat to the
peace.70 However, absent authorization from the Council, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization had no right to resort to enforcement action. The members
of the Organization, individually or collectively, are entitled to invoke self-de-
fense when faced with armed attacks by (or at least from) other states. But when
there is no armed attack against a sovereign state, and in the face of humanitar-
ian repression amounting only to a threat to the peace, only the Security Council
is empowered by the Charter to use, or to authorize the use of, force.
It is true that the Security Council did not condemn the air campaign in Ser-
bia and Kosovo.71 All the same, inaction by the Security Council does not
amount to authorization for collective security measures, even by a regional or-
ganization.72 The language of Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security
Council following the agreement between the parties that ended the air attacks,
did not imply retroactive ratification of the use of force by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.73 In any event, the Security Council’s authorization
must be sought before, not subsequent to, regional enforcement action.74
Otherwise, a permanent member of the Security Council could “shift the
burden of the veto” by acting unilaterally and then blocking any resolution
terminating the action.75
It appears that the right to humanitarian assistance—as it exists under contem-
porary international law—is quite limited in scope. There is no doubt that there
is a growing demand by world opinion for extension of the right. Such an exten-
sion would require new international legislation, in the form of a new treaty,
which in turn should address the problems arising both in peacetime and in
time of armed conflict (either international or internal).
It is regrettable that instead of addressing this core issue, the substance of the
law of humanitarian assistance, recent debate has focused on the question of en-
forcement. Humanitarian assistance must not be confused with unilateral or re-
gional “humanitarian intervention.” The moral duty of providing relief to
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innocent victims of armed conflict and natural disasters devolves on the entire
international community. Enforcement, where necessary, should be authorized
by the central organ of that community—the Security Council.
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